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The needjor a Atatutor' corporate rescue mechanism hais long been recogniaed in Hong Kong.
That need wa heavi 
,  
ndercored by the recent Asianfinancial risi. Following recommen-
dationA made in 1996 by the Law Reform Commiwson of Hone Ling, legislation was intro-
duced in Januay 2000, in the forim nti Lompanni (Amendtente Bill 2000. I,,e Bill
poposed a egimne, to be known as "provisional supeuiion , which would allow a compa;y
without havttg to go to court to appoint an insolLc sJpecalist to take over its 41,,is
under the protection oj a moratorium. Once appointed, the provisional Aupervi~or wouldjor-
mulate a plan/or voluntay arrangementjor approval the compaIns creditor6. However,
after serious opposition aa raiied agaimt the Bill the prov iional Aupervi6 ion proposab wre
dropped. It isanticipated that a modfiedprovisional .vuapesion regine will soon be put back
on the leMative agenda. 7Vs pafper offe; a critical an c!, o ,the provisional supeuison
regime contained in the Bill, with particular emphasis on the Goveonment' contmrovreialpro
poAab regarding the right6 of Aecured creditor6 and the treatment oj workers' wage.
Hong Kong's insolvency law has always borne close resemblance to its English
counterpart, although this is scarcely surprising for a territory which was a British
colony for 150 years. 1 Accordingly, it was to be expected that, following the intro-
duction of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986), Hong Kong would conduct its own
insolvency law reform exercise. In 1990 the Law Reform Commission of Hong
Kong (LRC)2 first took up the matter. A Sub-Committee on Insolvency was
formed, and its deliberations were divided into three parts, namely personal insol-
vency, corporate rescue and winding-up. More than a decade has now passed,
but the reform process still has not been completed. Extensive amendments to the
* Associate Prolessor, Facuhy ol'La University of Hong Kong.
* Associate Professor and Director, Asian Institute of International Financial Law, Facullty of Law,
Uni versity oflHong Kong.
SThe People's Republic of China, of course, resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July 1997.
The LRC is ihe 1rough equivalent o the Law,( Commission of'England and Wales.
Initially, the Sub(Cflflittee (ix the suliec:t into two parts personal insolveny and every
-
thing else but subsequently coq)orate rescue \,\as hived ofl" lrorn winding-up to lbirm a lrther
separate report. See LRC, Report on Corporate Rcue and hI.soent Tradng (Hong Kong, Government
Printer, October 1996), paras 4 5 (hercaltc Repor" ; available at <hup://wwwv. in.gov.k/l hkre-
forni/reports/index ltrn>. The Report was pr...ded I a1 (1 by onsultation paper see The LRC Sub-
C(ommittee on Insolvency, Consultation Paper on (orporte Re cue and I ,oLent Trading (Hong Kong,
Government PrinterJune 1995).
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Bankruptcy Ordinance were passed in 1996," closely tracking Parts VIII and IX
of the IA 1986. Similarly, the LRC's recent recommendations oi winding-up' rely
heavily oi the current English legislation. However, in relation to corporate res-
cue, the LRC, whilst not ignoring English precedents, has chosen its own route."
The LRC's recommendations were published in October 1996 but first
emerged in legislative form in the Companies (Amendment) Bill 2000 (the Bill),7
as a proposed new Part IVB ("Provisional Supervision and Voluntary
Arrangements") of the Companies Ordinance (CO)Y8 However, the provisions on
corporate rescue met with criticism, and the Hong Kong Legislative Council Bills
Committee decided inJune 2000 that they needed to be reconsidered."
This paper, after briefly outlining the impact of the Asian financial crisis upon
corporate insolvency practice in Hong Kong, offers a critical appraisal of the
provisional supervision regime as proposed in the Bill. Particular emphasis is
given to the Government's controversial treatment of secured creditors and
workers' wages: interestingly, in respect of both these issues, the approach taken
in the Bill would appear to be a departure from the earlier recommendations of
the LRC. 10
A. LIQUIDATIONS, WORKOUTS AND THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
The onset of the Asian financial crisis'' in mid-1997 forcefully brought home the
pressing need for a statutory corporate rescue mechanism in Hong Kong. For the
first half of 1997, roughly 45 compulsory winding-up orders were made each
month: the figure for the corresponding period in 1998 showed an almost 20%
increase, and similar year-on-year increases occurred in 1999 and 2000. 1) There
4 See Bankrtipiy Ordinance (Cap 6), Laws oiHong Kong (IHK).
Report on the llind Up Proviions of the Comrf)anie Oriance (Hong Kong, Government PrinterJuly
1999); available at <h lip: / / in l(. gin hk hkrel in / rep ot s / x.h im>
o The proposed provisional supervision regnie is more similar to c orporate voluntary administrations
under the (Aus'alian) Coq)orations Law 1989 (C l), Pt 5.3A, than it is to administrations under
IA 1986, Pt 11.
7 The Bill \,\as gazetted on 7 Jantiary 20(). See Hong in. G-oenment Gazete Legal Supplement
No. 3, (5. The Bill and background materials are available at <http:// ,Ww.legco.gov.hk/yr99-
O0/english/ bc/bO 6/gencral/ebc6.hrn>.
8 Companies Ordinance (Cap 32), LHK. The proposed Pt IVB consists of 33 sections, which woul
be added to ihe CO as ss 16U 16ZZA.
See the postscript to this paper below tor changes proposed i the recently published Companies
'Coq)orate Rescue) Bill 200 1, iqfra n. 91.
As to which, see CD Booth, "Hong Kong Corporate Rescue Proposals: Making Secured Creditors
NMlore Sectire" (1998) 14 Insolenr Law and Practice 248, 251 3; and iua i. 47 and accompanyiig text.
1 See, generally, ID Elbert, "The Asian Flnancial Crisis and the Need for a New Global inancial
Architecture" (1998) 13 Buttemwoths Journal ofnternational Banking and Financial Law 454.
12 Ie statistics are available at <hitt://v\AW, intgo\hk/oro/statistics/ldex.ltn>. Note also
j Yam, "Hong Kong: From Crisis to Recovery", Qarterdy Bulletin, November 1999, 41; available at
<lttp://N A ,v .infgovhk/hkna/eg/public/1) 9911/tochtmm>.
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are, of course, no statistics for corporate rescues, yet anecdotal evidence points to
the inevitable increase in the number of companies that have sought to reschedule
their debt or enter into informal workouts. 13
In April 1998 the Hong Kong Association of Banks (HKAB) issued guidelines
on corporate workouts,' such guidelines being closely modelled on the London
Approach. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA)1' collaborated with
the HKAB in formulating, in 1999, a revised set of principles, entitled the "Hong
Kong Approach to Corporate Difficulties". 1 ' Like the London Approach, the
Hong Kong guidelines are non-statutory and lack the support of an enforceable
moratorium. At present, the only statutory option available to a company hoping
to avoid liquidation is to formulate a scheme of arrangement pursuant to section
166 of the Companies Ordinance (identical to section 425 of the Companies Act
1985). Although a small number of schemes of arrangement in respect of insolvent
companies have been successfully concluded in Hong Kong over the last couple of
years,17 the deficiencies of the scheme of arrangement as a corporate rescue mech-
anism require no laboration.1'
B. PROVISIONAL SUPERVISION
1. Introduction
In Hong Kong, unlike in England, it is not the practice of the LRC to include draft
legislation with its reports.19 Accordingly, whilst the LRC's report in 1996 set out
the broad framework of the proposed provisional supervision regime, it was not
until the Bill (in January 2000) that precise details became available. In general
terms, however, the key characteristics of the provisional supervision regime as
iFor details, see CD Booth, Local Stud, of hsoliency Low Regimes: Report on Hong ong., China (Asian
Development Bank's Insolvency Law Reform Projet ; available at <Ittp:X//'NA iM.iNolve1( yasia.
com/insolvcticy law regimes/hongkong/indcx.html >.
See IF Iletcher andJ M1Guinness, "Export of London Approach to Hong Kong", Recove~r, June
1999, 24.
The HKI A 11nctions in niany respects as if it were a central bank for Hong Kong.
16 HKM\ Quartely Bulletin, November 1999, 13; available at <hip://www\\ b gov hk/hkma/
eng/iil li b/w911/ tit>. D Carse, "Hong Kong Approach to Corporate Difficulties",
O/arte) Bulletin, February 2000, 70; available at <htp://x\w\x.inl).go\hk/kta/cng/public/
9 b2000(02/to .hti>.
1 See, e.g. Re Lansa General International Iurance Co Ltd [1999] 2 HKLRD 429; on appeal, [1999]
3 HKLRD 9 1; and tim comment by 1 Steinberg and R Gregorian 119991 -nternational Corporate and
Cowmercial Low Review 220.
18 See The Report of hIe Insolvency Law Review Committee, Insolvencr Lau and Practice, Cmnd 8558
(1982) ("the Cork Report"), paras 400 430, bor details.
1 The Sub-Committee ol Insolvency attached a "model Bill" to its 1995 consultation paper, uVujra
n. 3. However, in the Report, supra n. 3 (Itiaoduction, para. 10) lit C \ revealed that "it was never
intended that it i.e. the nodel BillI should I)e adopted as draft legislation".
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proposed by the LRC-with the significant qualifications noted above2° are
reflected in the Bill. A number of central features can be identified. 2 1
First, rejecting a debtor-in-possession approach, the LRC favoured the appoint-
ment of a "provisional supervisor" a qualified insolvency specialist 22  to take
over the running of the company whilst formulating a proposal for a "voluntary
arrangement" to be put to the company's creditors. Approval by the creditors,
who vote as one single class, requires approval by a majority in number and in
excess of two-thirds in value of the creditors. 23 Following the adoption of a volun-
tary arrangement, management powers would return to the directors, whilst the
provisional supervisor would (normally) become the supervisor of the voluntary
arrangement, with overall responsibility to ensure compliance with its terms.
2
'
Secondly, the provisional supervision regime is not confined to companies that
are insolvent or likely to become insolvent; a provisional supervisor may be
appointed "whether or not the company is able to pay its debts". 2 ) Thirdly, a
moratorium comes into operation on the "relevant (late", i.e. when the provisional
supervisor is appointed. 213 Such appointment does not require any court involve-
ment, but occurs upon the filing of the relevant documentation. 27 Fourthly, the
moratorium binds all creditors-with the exception of a limited category of
secured creditors, called "major creditors" 28  whose debts were owing prior29 to
the relevant (late. Fifthly, the moratorium initially lasts for 30 days, but can be
extended for up to six months upon an application by the provisional supervisor
to the court. 3 The moratorium cannot be extended by the court beyond six
months from the relevant date, although such an extension can be granted by a
meeting of the creditors.3' Finally, the Bill sets a "low threshold" for the appoint-
ment of a provisional supervisor, since it requires only that the appointor, which
would normally be the board of directors, is satisfied that there is a reasonable
21 See supra n. 10 and acconpanying text.
21 See alsoJB Bannister, "Staying ) live in Hong Kong: a Comparative Review" (2000) 16 hnotenOC
Law and Practice 17; Booth, supra n. 10, 248.
'2 The appointment by the Official Receiver of suitably qualified individuals to a panel of provisional
super\isors is (ontemplated by the Bill (CO, s. 168X).
"3 Report, upra n. 3, para. 16.37; this is reflected in CO, s. 168Z1(2), (11).
24 Report, su/ra n. 3, paras 16.42 16.44; (10, s. 168ZU.
"' C 0, s. 168Y(2(a); Report, ,ifa n. 3, para. 3.9.
21 CO, s. 168ZD(I); Reow sura 1n. 3, para. 5.12.
2CO, s. 168ZA; Repot,4wpra n. 3, para. 6.1.
See., Itrther, inra n. 51 and accompanying text
Debts 11curred after the relevant (late are expressly not subject to the moratorium (CO,
s. 168ZD(4)(a)). 6f the position under IA 1986, PtII, where tle suspension ol creditors' remedies
applies to both pre-conmmencement and post-commencemient debts. In Australia, the moratorium
applies to any cour proceedings against the company (Corporaions Law, s. 4401(1)), alhhough a
deed of company arrangement is not binding on creditors in respect of claims g iin aftei the (late
tle adminisiation conmenced (ibid., ss 444D(I), 444A(4)(i)).
0 CO, s. 16LE (2); Report, supra n.3, paras 5.12 5.17. lndiidual creditors can at any tiine apply to
the oul tto be exempted Ii-om the moratorium on the basis of"signilicanl financial h rdship" (CO,
s. 16BZL(4I).
SCO, s. 168ZS(2)(a); Report, supra n. 3, paras 5.32 5.33.
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likelihood that a proposal could be made which would achieve one or more of the
following purposes: 32
"(a) a more advantageous realisation of the company's property than would be eflected
ol a winding up of the company;
(b) the survival of the company, and the whole or any part of its undertaking, as a going
concern; or
(c) the more advantageous satisfaction, in whole or in part, of the debts and other
liabilities of the company... "
In particular, the intended provisional supervisor does not have to prepare any
preliminary report, nor is there any requirement that the intended provisional
supervisor must declare that he is satisfied that there is a reasonable prospect of the
achievement of one or more of the specified purposes. (The LRC was, perhaps,
more concerned about encouraging directors to appoint a provisional supervisor
than about over-optimistic assessments as to the prospects of a successful rescue. 33)
2. Criticism and comment
(a) Solvent cornpanies and their shareholders
That a moratorium is initially available without any court intervention, or the
preparation of reports by an insolvency practitioner, distinguishes provisional
supervision from administration under Part II of the IA 1986. This streamlined
procedure should lead to substantial savings in both cost and time.3, Moreover, as
noted above, the Bill contemplates a company going into provisional supervision
whether or not it is insolvent or is likely to become insolvent.3) Yet, the Bill makes
no provision for meetings of shareholders. Where a restructuring regime is linked
to the insolvency of a company, as, for example, in England (administrations)36
and Australia (corporate voluntary administrations),37 it is understandable that
shareholders having little or no tangible interest are not given the chance to
vote down a plan approved by the creditors. But if the regime is available to sol-
vent companies, it is difficult to see why the creditors' meeting should alone deter-
mine the outcome. A better course to follow might be the company voluntary
administration (CVA) procedure in England which is not restricted to insolvent
companies-under which a proposal must be submitted to both creditors and
3' CO, s. 168z1).
3 The LRC (Report, supra n. 3, para. 1.39) n(oted that mfaiy comlpanties (inl(1titding listed companies) iii
Hong Kong are family oxwned and run, antid that the family mnight be veWry reluctant to allow ail out-
sider such as a provisionlal stipervisoi to assume control.
31 Bannister, sufa ti. 21, 19.
'5 See supra n. 25 and acompanying text.
36 IA 1986, s.8 1)( a.
J7 Corporations Law, s. 436A(l)(a).
3" IA 1986, s. I(1.
DECEMBER 2001
Rejorming Corporate Revcue Procedureo in Hong bng JCLS VOL. I PART 2
shareholders for approval.38 Indeed, a "voluntary arrangement" is explained in
the Bill as meaning an arrangement providing for either "(i) a composition in sat-
isfaction of the company's debts; or (ii) a scheme of arrangement of the company's
affairs".39 This is, in substance, the same meaning given to the term "voluntary
arrangement" in section 1(1) of the IA 1986. The absence from the Bill of any spe-
cific procedural safeguards designed to protect shareholders would seem to leave
the (minority) shareholders in a vulnerable position. 1
In short, these commentators would suggest that there is an inherent contradic-
tion in a rescue or restructuring regime which, on the one hand, encompasses
schemes of arrangement for solvent companies yet, on the other, excludes share-
holder participation in such cases.
(b) Secaured creditors: general rights
The position under the IA 1986 is that in an administration the interests of secured
creditors are given extensive protection. " ' Although the administrator has power
to dispose of property which is subject to a floating charge, the chargeholder does
not lose its priority in relation to the proceeds of disposal.4 2 Where property is
subject to a fixed charge, the court may order its disposal, but again without prej-
udicing the chargeholder's interest in the proceeds of disposal. "3 In relation to a
CVA, a proposal which affects the right of a secured creditor to enforce its secu-
rity cannot be approved at a meeting, except with the concurrence of the creditor
concerned. " It might be expected, therefore, that broadly similar protection
would be given in the Bill to secured creditors in Hong Kong. Yet there is no pro-
vision in the Bill that would prevent the creditors' meeting from approving a pro-
posal which directly impairs the rights of secured creditors."' Thus, for example,
a majority of creditors holding 70% of the corporate debt could approve a pro-
posal that all creditors secured and unsecured alike should release 60% of their
debt and accept 40% payable by the company over a three-year period. (That in
certain instances a minority secured creditor might perhaps be able to petition the
court on the basis that his rights were in substance being expropriated by the
majority, does not detract from the wider issue of whether secured creditors' pre-
existing rights can in general be diluted by a vote in the creditors' meeting.) When
CO, s. 168U.
40 In theory, a (\eahhy) shareholder could bring unlair prejudice proceedings pursuant to CO,
s. 168A (a replica of Companies Act 1985, s. I59), since s. 168A is exempted from the moratorium
(CO,s. 168ZD(4)(g ). Howe eor, the creditors' meeing ould xell appro e a poposal belorc a shaie-
holder would be in a position to start unfair preludice proceedings.
41 h has fiequently been argued that English insolvency iaw overly protects secured creditors. See
D Milman and DEIM M1ond, SecuiJtmu and C(oi forat Rescue Manchester, Hodgsons, 1999}.
42 J\ I986, s. 15(1), (4).
'13 Ibid., s. 15(2), (5 .
44 Ibid., s. 43.
1, Y See now the postscript to this paper below for more recent changes.
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questions were put to the Government in Hong Kong as to whether, as in the
above example, a proposal could be passed against the wishes of a secured credi-
tor requiring all creditors to take a "haircut", the response was that just such a
scenario had been contemplated.4"
The incorporation of such a premise into the provisional supervision regime
would have important consequences for bank-lending in Hong Kong. For
instance, a bank might take a floating charge, anticipating that in the possible
event of a liquidation (or receivership) it would be adequately protected. However,
under the Bill, the creditors' meeting might force the bank to take a haircut. As the
bank could have no idea when taking its security what the position might be should
the borrower go into provisional supervision (perhaps several years later), that risk
would have to be factored into the costs of corporate borrowing.
The LRC (lid not raise the issue of secured creditors being forced to take a hair-
cut. Moreover, there are passages in the Reportwhich suggest that the LRC's inten-
tion was that no proposal which modified the rights of a secured creditor could be
approved unless the secured creditor gave its consent. " ' The undermining of
secured creditors' rights to the extent apparently envisaged by the Bill is
simply unacceptable, and it is to be hoped that the Government will mo(lify its
position so as clearly to protect the position of secured creditors (subject to a lim-
ited "cramdown" provision).4 8 (See postscript to this paper below).
(() Secured creditors: veto power
Leaving to one side the general position of secured creditors, there is also an issue
concerning the right conferred upon certain secure(l creditors to veto a provisional
supervision.
Under the English administration regime, the holder of a floating charge over
the whole or substantially the whole of the company's assets can, in general,
appoint an administrative receiver, thereby preventing the making of an adminis-
tration order."' In Australia, the legislation is not restricted to floating charges,
and permits the holder of a charge or charges over the whole or substantially the
whole of the company's property to proceed with enforcement regardless of the
16 As part of ati exchange of correspondence between P Smart at1( the Office of the OfficiaI Receiver
in January and February 2000.
17 See, e.g. Repot ,sufua n. 3, para. 13.17 ("Secured creditors would ... be protected in that the provi-
sional supervisor could not dispose o secured properly wxithotit the consent ol the secired credi-
tor"'. The LRC's initial proposals appeared, if anything, to enhance the position of secured
creditors. See Booth, supra n.10.
1. Whereby a provisional supervisor can demonstrate to the court that a secuc reditor's interests
would not be discriminated against tlairly and that the sectured creditor would receive "lhir and
equitable" treatment under a rescue plan. These principles are xwell known i1 relation to Chapter
I Ie organisations under the US Bankruptcy Code, § 1129(1))(), (2).
' IA 1986, s. 9(3,.
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administration. 5° The Bill requires the provisional supervisor, within three work-
ing days of his appointment, to give relevant notice to each of the company's
"major creditors"."1 The notice requires the major creditor, within a maximum of
seven days from the relevant (late, to inform the provisional supervisor whether
the creditor consents to the continuation of the provisional supervision. 2) Where
a major creditor specifically refuses to consent, the provisional supervision termi-
nates. " 3 A major creditor is defined as:
"the holder of a charge over the whole or substantially the whole of the company's prop-
erty if, but only if, the claim under the charge amounts to not eim than 33V% oJ the liabili-
ties of the cornpany before the relevant date."'54
It is suggested that the reference to 33'/% of the company's liabilities may at
times place an impracticable administrative burden upon a provisional supervisor,
in particular when required to ascertain, within three days of his appointment,
whether there is one or more "major creditors". For example, where there is a
group of companies (some members of which are solvent and some insolvent) and
cross-guarantees have been given, the total liabilities of one company within the
group may be far from immediately apparent. There will also be instances where
a company's accounts are missing, wholly inadequate or even a work of fiction.
The rationale underlying the 33'% requirement is presumably that a company
may well have granted several charges, particularly floating charges, and a veto
should not be given to every chargeholder. 55 However, in terms of principle, this
rationale is somewhat lacking, since there is no difference in principle between one
secured creditor holding 34% of the corporate debt and another holding 32%.
Nor will it be overlooked that a company, shortly before going into provisional
supervision, might deliberately allow its total indebtedness to increase so as to
dilute a particular secured creditor's "share" from 34% to 32%. 56 Moreover, it is
SCorporation Law, s. 41 A. See P Crutchfield, Coiporate VoluhtaO Adnnistration ILau (New South
Wales, LBC Inlormation Services, 2nd edn, 1997), 125 31.
C1 (O, s. 168ZL1. The Bill contains one exception, which roughly corresponds to IA 1986, s. 215,
namely \\here an insolvent company created the harge in the 12 months prior to tic relevant date.
See nfra i. 62.
12 Where consent is given (or deemed to have been given, see infa i. 53) a major cireditor is bound by
the provisional supetrXsion (CO, s. 168ZQ3)(I)(ii))
CO, s. 168Z7Q2)(a). IIa major creditor objects butt Iails to inlborn the provisional supervisor, the
major creditor is treated as having consented (ibid., s. 168ZQ3)(a)).
51 Ibid., s  168Z 5) (emphasis added). This requirement has recendy been removed. See postscrip to
this paper below.
55 Report, supra n. 3, paras 13, 14.
A) These commentators wouti suggest that ginig a veto to a secured creditor holting 33 /o% or more
ol'the company's debl is unnecessary. Since a sectred creditor can vote without having to give tip
his security (Rcport, ,ura n. 3, para. 16.36', one-third of the company's total debt woult be sufficient
to block any proposal at the creditors' meeting. The LRC did not specik any partictilar percntage,
but mterely referred to a "holder of any charge over the whole or substantially the whole of a com-
pany's assets, whose level ol exposure or lending would \\arrant such an extensive charge" (ibid.,
para. 13.8).
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doubtful whether a reference to a specified percentage of total indebtedness
would, in fact, prevent (well-advised) lenders from obtaining a veto, since a lender
might require that any loan be made to a special purpose subsidiary company, to
which essential assets had been transferred..,7 In addition, in many instances, a
director's potential personal liability under a bank guarantee might function just
as effectively as a statutory veto.- '
These commentators would suggest that the 33'/3% (or indeed any other per-
centage) requirement is ill-conceived.
(d) Creditors, management and connected persons
A statutory corporate rescue regime, like any other insolxency procedure, seeks to
strike a balance between the various and often competing interests that will be pre-
sent in any given case. These commentators' view is that in two particular areas
the Bill appears overly to favour management to the detriment of ordinary credi-
tors. The first deals with voting; the second concerns avoidance powers.
Under the IA 1986, in relation to both administrations and CVAs, a resolution
at a creditors' meeting will be invalid if a majority of independent creditors vote
against it.- ' Specific protection for non-associated creditors is also available under
the Australian legislation.13 However, there is no such protection under the Bill
1
(perhaps because the LRC did not address this issue).
In addition, both the Report and the Bill are silent as to the ability of the provi-
sional supervisor to avoid transactions, such as unfair preferences, transactions at
an undervalue, or extortionate credit transactions.6 2 In comparison, under the LA,
1986 the full range of avoidance powers is conferred upon an administrator."13 It
is otherwise in relation to a CVA, yet the directors, when making their initial pro-
posal, must include details of, first, whether there are any circumstances giving rise
to the possibility, in the event that the company should go into liquidation, of avoid-
able transactions, and, secondly, whether (and if so, how) it is proposed under the
Thus, as iar as ihe subsidiary is concerned, the bank wvould be a "-rajoir creditor" and have a vec.
Additionally, as essential assets are owned by the subsidiar, the parent cannot be rescued unless the
subsidiary is par o he ic plan.
The Bill does not contain a provision suspending the enforcement of directors' guarantees during
the period ol provisional supervision. 6fCorporations Law, s. 440J I).
Insolvency Rules 1986 (SI 1986/1925', r. 1.191 (C\A and r. 2.281A) (adminristration). See now
posts( ript to this paper belox.
O Corporations Law, s. 60OA; and see Crutchfield, .,upra n. 50, 216 7.
WA hether thc (ourt could inlcrvone perhaps on thc basis that the rnajoriy was not acting in good
faith is problematic, since approval of a proposal is not a matter for the court and there is no gen-
eral "unl'air pr judie" reined) available to creditors under the Bill (cfT I 1916, ss 6, 27).
2 Rcort, sujra n. 3, para. 13.19 dli recommend that either a fixed or floating charge created within
12 months ol'the provisional supervision by an insolvcin company should be invalid, ex cept to ihe
amount of anr cash paid to the comparn at the time of or subsequently to the creation of the charge.
Sce CO, s. I 1ZQ4), \x\hich approximnately (orresponds to A 1986, s. 245.
tm See IA 1986, ss 238- 11, 214 5.
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voluntary arrangement to make provision indemnifying the company in respect
of such claims.' 1 Accordingly, from the very outset, the existence of any prior
transactions which may possib9' be impeached must be revealed.'- In Australia,
although the avoidance powers applicable in a liquidation are not available in a
corporate voluntary administration,36" the administrator, in his report to creditors,
must specify whether, in his opinion, the company has entered into any transac-
tions which would appear to be liable to be avoided should the company go into
liquidation."' An administrator is also under a duty, 1titer alia, to report any
relevant misapplication of the company's property, breach of duty, default or neg-
ligence.1'
8
Although the LRC (lid not specifically address the question of avoidance pow-
ers, it is these commentators' understanding that the LRC considered that the
presence of avoidance powers would be a disincentive for directors when deciding
whether or not to initiate provisional supervision; and, in addition, that it might be
difficult to exercise avoidance powers within the relatively short time-period con-
templated for provisional supervision. Two observations may, perhaps, be made.
First, the availability of avoidance powers would be of little concern to an honest
director. Secondly, although an avoidance action could not realistically be com-
pleted within the relatively short time-period envisaged for provisional supervi-
sion, the availability of such powers would change the relative bargaining
strengths of the parties. In short, whether or not a full range of avoidance powers
is ultimately made available under the provisional supervision regime, at the very
least significant disclosure and reporting requirements should be specified in the
legislation. Otherwise, provisional supervision may be seen by creditors as provid-
ing an easy opportunity for management to sweep past irregularities under the
carpet. 31
61 Insolvency Rules 1986, r. 1.3(2)(c)(iii).
6 Hence, it ias been stated that "creditors would want ve specific assurances that any monies whi I
have been tlnlairly disbursed by the ornpany will be re covered by the supervisor cir ihe general
body of unsecured creditors. Certainly the creditors xill not agree to preferences, undervalues, etc.
being cirgot ten h\\hen such t'ansac tons could be vigorously atta ked by a liquidator in a winding-
up situation" PG Eades, In oheng: A Practical I4gal Handbook Jor hlanacer (Cambridge, Gresham
Books, 1996) 113).
6 BH M1Plherson, The Lau of Compair Liquidation (New South W\ales, LBS Information Services, 4th
edn, 1999), 10.
61 Corporations Regulations (Cth, r. 5.3A.02. See also Cruthhfield, vujra n. 50, 99 101.
6,'3 Coq)orations Law, s. 438D.
69 This issue ias now been addressed in the Companies (Corporate Rescue' Bill 2001; see postscript
to this paper )lbelow.
0 See, e.g. E Yiu, "Newlaw protects laid offxorkers", South Chi -aIoi nmgPost, 4June 1999; S Yeung"
Legislators quesion merits ol xwages plan", South China hVfonug Post, 23 February 2000; J Molir,
"'Unworkable' rescue bill bounces back into Legeo", South (hina IiPos, 6 lFebruary 2001.
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C. WORKERS' WAGES
Broader public debate in Hong Kong oi the Bill has largely focused oi the issue
of workers' wages. U The Bill startlingly proposes that, before a company can even
go into provisional supervision, it must have either actually paid off all outstand-
ing sums owing to its workers (pursuant to the Employment Ordinance) 71 or estab-
lished a trust account containing sufficient funds to satisfy those debts.
Where a company is insolvent and a winding-up petition has been presented in
Hong Kong,7 2 employees who are owed wages and other entitlements can apply
to the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund (PWIF) for ex gnatia payments up
to specified amounts. 73 (The PWIF was to some extent modelled on the UK
National Insurance Fund,7" although it is funded by a fixed levy on businesses reg-
istering in Hong Kong rather than by employees' contributions.) The Report pro-
posed that the onset of provisional supervision should trigger the operation of the
PWIF.7 ' However, concerns were subsequently expressed that unscrupulous
employers might lay off their employees without paying them their entitlements
and then put the company into provisional supervision, thereby passing the bur-
den of unpaid wages, severance and other payments onto the PWIF.76 It may be
noted that in the financial year 1997 98 the PWIF recorded its first ever deficit
(HK$25 million), as the number of claims by employees increased by more than
60% over the previous year.77 The Governmient's estimate7 8was that there would
be deficits of HK$160 million in 1998 99, HK$114 million in 1999 2000, and
HK$108 million in 2000 01. There was concern in certain quarters as to the
71 Ca) 57, LHK. Such suns woul include wages and severance payments. The latter (al be
substantial and would typically be about HK$30,000 (2500) O r a worker with two years' service,
rising to HK$300,000 (C25,000) fbr a worker with 20 years' service.
72 Protection o 'Wages on Insov ency Ordinance (Cap 380), 1HK, s. I6(I)(b).
73 'Two p)0its may be noted. First, tic fact that aii insolvent company hlas gone into creditors' volun-
tary liquidaion or receivership does not trigger the operation olthe PW\IF, since s. l6(I)(b) relcis
only to the presentation of a winding-up petition. In respect of a creditors' voluntay liquidation,
employees have prCeliential status (CO, s. 265) and, where a receiver is app ointed by a floating
charge holer, emplyers have a similar preftrential status (ibid., s. 79). Secondly, however, the imn-
its under ihe P\\IF are li higheir han the limits applicable to workers' prelerential clains under
the CO. For example, under the PW\II up to HK$36,000 may be claimed for unpaid wages; the
alnount ol the corresponding preleiential debt under the CO is only HK$8,000 (s. 265(IB)). As a
consequence, workers often present a whiuing-u ) 1)tition lhaving hrst obtainew ll ai) e(eC
though a creditors' voltintary liquidation is already in progress. See Re Rena Gabriel HKLtd [1995]
2 HKC 273.
74 See now the Employment Rights Act 1996, s. 184.
7 Reot, .snra n. 3, para 5.'12.
76 K Cooper, "Authorities lear exploitation of' workers aid Ilund", outh China Alomn Pos4
22 December 1998.
77 Annual Report ofthe Protection ofages on Iubolleny Fund Board 1997 98, 5.
7 Hcolng Hansard, 3 February 1999 (see <http / w .1egco whk/yrQ9-nglis/countg/
ni sarci/990203l.hm>). In Iacl, Ihe Annual Report fthe Protetion of hTeage on Insolceuc' Fund Board
1998 99, 3, reveals a HK$185.3 million deficit for 1998 99.
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potential insolvency of the PWIF. Following a consultation exercise,"' the Bill was
drafted so that the appointment of a provisional supervisor could not come into
effect until the appointor had filed an affidavit stating that the company either: (a)
had opened a trust account (with a bank) containing sufficient funds to discharge
"all debts and liabilities" to its employees arising under the Employment
Ordinance; or (b) had actually discharged all such liabilities. 8 ' These commenta-
tors know of no other jurisdiction in which the treatment of outstanding workers'
wages creates such an obstacle to the promotion of any attempted rescue.
Moreover, banks might well be unwilling to lend additional sums to a company,
since the money would go straight to the workers rather than actually assisting in
re-financing the company. In addition, a company contemplating provisional
supervision might be tempted to stop making any effort to pay its trade creditors,
and hoard as much cash as possible in order to accumulate a sufficient lump sum
to pay off its workers. It is fair to say that the Bill encourages what, in other cir-
cumstances, would be condemned as a preference.8 1 More importantly, as
drafted, the Bill produces inconsistency. Where an insolvent company is wound
up, the workers can look to the PWIF for payment only up to specified maximum
amounts; 2 but were that very same company to go into provisional supervision,
"all debts and liabilities" owed to the workers would have to be discharged. (In
other words, the "relative value" of workers' claims will be distorted upon the deci-
sion whether to go into provisional supervision or to liquidate.8 3) Finally, although
the reference to "all debts and liabilities" might appear to protect workers, in prac-
tice the opposite might often be the case; if a company cannot pay off its workers
in full, liquidation may be the only alternative.
In the Hong Kong Legislative Council, the Bills Committee identified the treat-
ment of workers' wages as an issue of major concern."' The Committee pointed
out that, as drafted, the Bill did not permit of any flexibility, so that even if a com-
pany's workers consented, the company could not pay them less than 100 % of
their statutory entitlements, whilst at the same time providing some other consid-
eration (such as stock options). The Bills Committee recommended the "early
resubmission" of the corporate rescue proposals to the incoming Legislative
Council and, in the meantime, suggested that: "the Administration should meet
79 Co6nsutation Paper on Corporate Rescue and the Protection of JI'ages on Insot eny Fund ( Treatmenet ofEmpo ee
i "Prov/ ional Supel2 / ion'), Februar 1999; available at <htt)://vwN\\.hifo.gov.k/f/b/-onstlt/
indcx.htn>.
CO, s. 16L8ZA()(ix . See postscript to this paper below.
The CO contains a provision on prcfreenccs (s. 266B) \hi(h is losely related o I 1986, s. 239.
B2 See .sura in. 73.
For an cxucnsivc discussion o1 relative valtues", see TH Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankrupto
,
Lau (Cambridge, Harxard University Press, 1986, 29.
4 Report of the Bil3 Committee on the Companies (Amendnment) Bill 2000 to House Committee feeting on 9 June
2000 (Legislative Council Paper, CB( 1 1779/99 00', 4, available at <htt)://leg gihk/yr99-
00/english/bc /bO /rcports/c06 rpt.htn>.
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with various professional bodies . . . so that the proposals can be fine-tuned".8 '
Whether the Committee was of the view that the treatment of workers' wages
merely needed some fine-tuning, so that some flexibility might be permitted, or
that a thorough overhaul was required, is not apparent.
These commentators would suggest that in relation to outstanding wages and
other entitlements, workers should generally be no better or worse off where a
company goes into provisional supervision than they would have been were the
company to have been liquidated. The Bill presently breaches this simple propo-
sitionl .1 Moreover, even if fine-tuned to allow for some flexibility (so that workers
might agree to accept less than 100% of their debts), this principle would still be
breached." Instead, the revised legislation might be drafted so as to contain three
elements.
(1) The notion of "employees' protected debts" 8 should be introduced. This term
would be defined so as precisely to track the various amounts that may be
claimed at present from the PWIF upon winding-up.
(2) Every proposal for a voluntary arrangement should be required to contain a
provision to the effect that any outstanding employees' protected debts will be
immediately satisfied in cash upon the voluntary arrangement coming into
effect (the only exception would be where an employee has waived this right in
writing).
(3) The court shall not extend the moratorium beyond the initial 30-day period,
unless either:
(a) the provisional supervisor undertakes that, within seven days of the court
granting the extension, all the employees' protected debts will be paid off,
or
(b) the court is satisfied that other arrangements have been agreed in writing
between the provisional supervisor and the employees that adequately pro-
tect the interests of the latter.
A rough outline of the manner in which these suggestions might work in prac-
tice is as follows. First, provisional supervision could be initiated, and the morato-
rium come into effect, without any payments being made "up front" to the workers.
Secondly, where the provisional supervision collapses within the 30-day morato-
rium period, 8 11 the company will go into liquidation and the workers may claim
from the PWIF in the normal way. Thirdly, if, however, a plan for a voluntary
Ibid., 5. The legislation has r enily been rcintroduced as tle Companies (Jorporac Rescue) Bill
2001 (see postscript below', but no significant change has been put forward i this particular area.
At \s workers might well re over sigificantly more upon the company going into provisional super-
vision than they would if the companiy were to go into liquidation.
Flexibility would in no w~ay reduce the disparity betw~een workers' entitlements in provisional super-
vision and hi liquidation.
Or some other similar expression.
89As woul often be the case.
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arrangement is approved within the 30-day period, the terms of the arrangement
must provide for the immediate payment (in priority to everything else) of the
employees' protected debts. Finally, where the provisional supervisor requires an
extension of the moratorium, the court will grant an extension only upon the con-
dition that, unless the workers have agreed otherwise, the employees' protected
debts are paid within seven days of the court's order.
D. CONCLUSION
These commentators would respectfully submit that the reasoning underlying the
proposed provisional supervision regime is fundamentally sound. In Hong Kong,
where even in an economic downturn professional fees are as high as anywhere in
the world,1 it is appropriate that a moratorium may initially be obtained without
the preparation of a detailed report or resort to the courts. At present, in relation
to both informal workouts and the Hong Kong Approach to Corporate
Difficulties, even where most creditors support a restructuring plan, one or two
obstinate creditors can seriously prejudice the prospects of a successful rescue. A
major advantage that would immediately flow from the enactment of the provi-
sional supervision regime is that the very possibility of putting a company into pro-
visional supervision and activating the moratorium will give cause to the
obstinate creditor to think again. It is in this context that the treatment of workers'
wages under the Bill is most disappointing. Not only is the treatment of workers'
wages inequitable, but the Bill also creates a major and unnecessary obstacle to the
commencement of provisional supervision. Another significant flaw in the Bill
concerns the possibility of forcing a "haircut" upon secured creditors. The proce-
dures proposed in the Bill are also deficient in relation to the complete exclusion
of shareholders from the provisional supervision process, the inclusion of a per-
centage of debt requirement in the definition of a major creditor, the lack of any
specific restriction on the power of connected creditors when voting at creditors'
meetings, and the failure to tackle the question of avoidable transactions. It is sin-
cerely to be hoped that these issues will be addressed in redrafted legislation over
the course of the next 12 months or, in any event, well in advance of the region's
next financial crisis.
PostScript
In May 2001 the Hong Kong Government gazetted revised legislation. This time,
rather than taking the form of an amendment to the Companies Ordinance, the
90 There ha\e been seveiral, rcenI(, high prolile insol\encies where Hong Kongjudges ha\e expiressed
disquiet over the level ofla ) ers' and acountants' fees. See, e.g. Re Pergrine Inesnent Holdigs Ltd
[1998] 2 HKIRD 670; Re Peregr-e h)estmet Holdbgs Ltd and others [1999] 3 HKlRD 59,( A; Re
Peregfine Inve.stment Holdings Ltd (VIb. 5) 120001 1 HKLRD 157.
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proposals are contained in a separate piece of legislation the Companies
(Corporate Rescue) Bill 2001.91 This new Bill closely follows the form and content
of the previous Bill, subject to changes in two main areas. First, in relation to
secured creditors, the new Bill expressly prevents the creditors' meeting from vot-
ing to modify the rights of a secured creditor, except where that creditor has given
consent.92 The new Bill also removes the reference to 33' 3% of the total corporate
debt when defining the term "major secured creditor".9 Secondly, the new Bill
has also addressed these commentators' concerns with reference to connected
creditors as well as to avoidable transactions. A resolution at the creditors' meet-
ing will not pass if a majority of independent creditors has voted against it;"" and
the provisional supervisor is placed under a specific duty to investigate transactions
which might have been avoided if the company had gone into liquidation. 9'
More importantly, however, the basic approach to the key issue of workers'
wages has not been changed in the new Bill. It is still required that all debts and
liabilities under the Employment Ordinance owing to a company's employees and
former employees must be paid off in full (or a trust account opened) before the
company may go into provisional superv ision.1 In short, unless and until the "all
debts and liabilities" approach to workers' wages is abandoned, it would appear
that the Government's commitment to promoting a "rescue culture" in Hong
Kong is half-hearted.
IHong Io;bg Golerlment Ga ette, legal Supplement No. 3, C615 ( 18 May 200 I).
92 Companies (Corporate Rescue' Bill 2001, s. 23(1).
9 Ibid., s. 19(5).
91 Ibid., Seventh Schedule, para. 23.
Ibid., Fourth Schecduc, para. 2.
96 Ibid., Second Schedule, para. 3(d).
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